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EXHAUSTION OF FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDIES IN CASES UNDER SECTION
1981 OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
It is a general rule of administrative law that a party must ex-
haust available administrative remedies prior to seeking judicial re-
lief.' An exception to this general exhaustion doctrine has been de-
veloped by a line of Supreme Court cases which indicate that one need
not exhaust his state administrative remedies prior to bringing suit un-
der section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.2 In two recent
cases 3 the Fifth Circuit has considered the question whether this excep-
tion should be extended to excuse exhaustion of federal administrative
remedies in cases brought under section 19814 of that Act. The ensu-
1. The Supreme Court has referred to this doctrine as "the long settled rule of
judicial administration that no one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threat-
ened injury until the prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted." Myers v.
Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1938) (citation omitted).
The Supreme Court's initial articulation of the doctrine in Prentis v. Atlantic
Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 230 (1908) marked the beginning of widespread recog-
nition of the doctrine. But manifestations of the doctrine were apparent in the early
federal court decisions of Altschul v. Gettings, 86 F. 200 (C.C.D. Ore. 1898) and Dun-
dee Mortgage Trust Inv. Co. v. Charlton, 32 F. 192 (C.C.D. Ore. 1887).
However, the exhaustion doctrine has not been consistently applied. Professor
Davis has made the following observation: "The law embodied in the holdings clearly
is that sometimes exhaustion is required and sometimes not." 3 K. DAvis § 20.01. For
general discussions of the exhaustion doctrine see 3 K. DAvis §§ 20.01-.10 and L. JAFFE
424-58.
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). The statute reads:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage of any State or Territory subjects or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Con-
stitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Section 1983 was enacted following the ratification of the fourteenth amendment in
order to provide a federal remedy for discrimination which is the result of state action
taken under color of state law. See United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941);
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). For an excellent discussion of the cases rele-
vant to the scope of section 1983, see Harrison v. Murphy, 205 F. Supp. 449, 450-
55 (D. Del. 1962).
Because of the emphasis on state action in section 1983 cases, they usually raise
the question of exhaustion of state rather than federal administrative remedies. See,
e.g., Damico v. California, 389 U.S. 416 (1967); McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S.
668 (1963).
3. Penn v. Schlesinger, 490 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1973); Beale v. Blount, 461 F.2d
1133 (5th Cir. 1972).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970). The statute reads:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the
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ing discussion will briefly review the exhaustion doctrine and the de-
velopment of the section 1983 exception to that doctrine. Thereafter,
it will critically examine the Fifth Circuit's rationale for refusing to
extend to section 1981 cases the section 1983 exception and will sug-
gest a more basic analysis which would provide an alternative justifica-
tion for that refusal.
Considerations of both procedural efficiency and comity underlie
the exhaustion requirement.5 Efficiency is promoted by permitting
administrative agencies to develop the facts of the cases with which
they deal and to exercise discretion in their areas of expertise without
the additional delay and expense which flow from interruption at the
intermediate stages of the process. 6 Moreover, a requirement of ex-
same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to
sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws
and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by
white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes,
license, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
Section 1981 was originally part of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, Act of April 9, 1866,
ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, enacted subsequent to the ratification of the thirteenth amend-
ment. Its stated purpose is the "protection of citizens of the United States in the en-
joyment of certain rights, without discrimination on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude . . . ." United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 555 (1875).
For a discussion of the statutory history of section 1981, see 1 B. ScHwAPTz, STATU-
TORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: CIVIL RIGHTS 99-101 (1970).
Section 1981 is analogous to section 1983 in that it provides a cause of action
for various discriminatory acts. However, in contrast to section 1983, section 1981
does not specifically include a "state action" requirement, see note 2 supra. But, until
recently, it was widely accepted that section 1981, like section 1983, applied only to
discrimination under color of state law. See, e.g., Valle v. Stengel, 176 F.2d 697 (3d
Cir. 1949); Waters v. Paschen Contractors, Inc., 227 F. Supp. 659 (N.D. Ill. 1964).
In Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), however, the Supreme Court
held that 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970) (a sister section to section 1981 which prohibits
discrimination in transactions of property in much the same language as is used in
section 1981) prohibited "all racial barriers in the acquisition of real and personal
property." 392 U.S. at 439 (emphasis added). Subsequently, the Fifth Circuit ex-
tended the Jones rationale to suits under section 1981, holding that a right of action
exists under section 1981 against a private employer. Sanders v. Dobbs Houses, Inc.,
431 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 948 (1971); accord, Waters
v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Int'l Harvester Co., 427 F.2d 476 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 911 (1970). In Penn v. Schiesinger, 490 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1973), this ration-
ale was extended even further to reach discrimination by federal agencies as well as
private employers and employers acting under color of state law. Id. at 702.
The section 1981 equal right "to make and enforce contracts" has been interpre-
ted as sufficiently broad to prohibit discrimination in most situations which involve em-
ployment contracts. See, e.g., Sanders v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 431 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir.
1970) (racial job discrimination by private employer held actionable); Waters v. Wis-
consin Steel Works of Int'l Harvester Co., 427 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1970) (racial dis-
crimination by union in its role as employees' agent held actionable).
5. See McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193-95 (1969); L. JAIE 424-
26; Berger, Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies, 48 YALE LJ. 981, 983-85 (1939).
6. See McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 194 (1969); Berger, supra note
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haustion may also promote efficiency in that the particular issue in
question may be rendered moot or insignificant by the final agency
decision. 7  The comity consideration flows from a recognition of the
fact that administrative agencies, as entities separate from the judi-
ciary, should be allowed to function with a minimum of judicial inter-
ference, especially when the matter involves an area in. which the
agency has special expertise or substantial discretionary authority.'
Commentators have differed over whether enforcement of the exhaus-
tion requirement should be mandatory or within the court's discretion,'
but the Supreme Court recently stated that the application of the doc-
trine to specific cases should depend on the relation of the purposes
of the requirement to the particular administrative scheme involved,
thus apparently accepting the discretionary theory.10
Exhaustion is not required when the administrative procedure is
inadequate to prevent irreparable injury"' or when recourse to the ad-
ministrative processes would be an exercise in futility.12 These in-
5, at 984. The importance of fact-finding by an expert administrative body has been
specifically recognized by the Supreme Court in Interstate Commerce Commission
cases. See, e.g., Board of R.R. Comm'rs v. Great N. Ry., 281 U.S. 412, 424 (1930);
Great N. Ry. v. Merchants Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285, 291 (1922).
7. See L. JAFFE 424; Berger, supra note 5, at 984. Professor Jaffe analogizes
the reasons behind the exhaustion rule to the reasons supporting the general rule that
review by a higher court is not available until the lower court has issued a final judg-
ment. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291-92 (1970).
8. See McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 194-95 (1969); Prentis v. Atlantic
Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 229-32 (1908); L. JAFFE 425; Berger, supra note 5,
at 984-85.
9. Compare 3 K. DAvis § 20.03 and L. JAFF 432-37 (discretionary) with Berger,
supra note 5, at 1006 (mandatory).
10. McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193 (1969).
11. See, Deering Milliken, Inc. v. Johnston, 295 F.2d 856 (4th Cir. 1961). In
Deering Milliken, the petitioner was being irreparably injured by the delay caused by
the National Labor Relations Board in its hearing process. Id. at 866. The court
noted that "the Board does not here contend that there is any administrative remedy
available to the plaintiff for the protection of the right asserted," id., and concluded:
mhe District Court had jurisdiction of this controversy and . . . the plain-
tiff was not precluded from turning to that court for the protection of its
right, since there was no available administrative remedy to make applicable
the principle requiring prior exhaustion of such remedies. Id.
12. Perhaps the clearest example of futility occurred in Williams v. Richardson,
347 F. Supp. 544 (W.D.N.C. 1972), in which the agency head was required by statute
to reject the plaintiffs claim. The court did not require the "empty formality" of an
administrative ruling denying the claim, id. at 548, but futility need not be so patently
obvious before exhaustion will be excused. See, e.g., Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U.S.
639, 640 (1968) (per curiam); McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668, 674-76
(1963); Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d 560, 568-69 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S.




stances are actually in harmony with the exhaustion doctrine because
the logic of the rule presupposes the existence of a viable administra-
tive remedy which offers protection of the asserted right sufficiently
substantial to warrant prohibiting immediate recourse to the courts.1"
There are, however, several important true exceptions to the ex-
haustion doctrine.14 Exhaustion may be avoided when an agency
makes an especially egregious error, such as assertion of a power con-
trary to a specific statutory provision.15 Under a closely related excep-
tion, the Second Circuit has dispensed with exhaustion when a peti-
tioner has made a substantial assertion that his constitutional rights
have been violated by agency action.1 6 If an agency action raises a
13. If recourse to the prescribed administrative process would cause irreparable
harm, there is clearly no administrative remedy vis-a-vis that particular injury; thus
exhaustion never enters the picture. L. JAFFE 426; see note 11 supra. Similarly, the
considerations of comity and efficiency which underlie the exhaustion doctrine, see
notes 5-8 supra and accompanying text, are not advanced by requiring recourse to
agency procedures when such recourse is almost certain to be futile. See note 12 supra.
14. See 3 K. DAvis §§ 20.02-.03; L. JAFFE 432-37; Note, Interim Relief and Exhaus-
tion of Administrative Remedies: A Study in Judicial Confusion, 1973 DUKE L.J. 275,
278-81, in 1972 Developments.
15. See Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958). The National Labor Relations
Act provides that to determine the appropriate unit for collective bargaining purposes
"the Board shall not (1) decide that any unit is appropriate for such purposes if such
unit includes both professional employees and employees who are not professional em-
ployees unless a majority of such professional employees vote for inclusion in such unit
.... " 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1) (1970). In Leedom, the Board refused to take a vote
to determine whether a majority of the professional employees affected by the action
before the Board would vote for inclusion in such a unit, and included both professionals
and non-professionals in the bargaining unit. Suit was brought in district court by the
professional employees seeking to have the Board's action set aside. 358 U.S. at 185-
86. The Supreme Court dispensed with exhaustion and held that the district court had
jurisdiction since the Board's order was, on its face, an attempt to exercise power con-
trary to a specific provision of the National Labor Relations Act.
However, Leedom "represents only a narrow and rarely successfully invoked excep-
tion" which is applicable only when the agency decision is "infused with error which
is of a summa or magna quality as contraposed to decisions which are simply cum
error." United States v. Feaster, 410 F.2d 1354, 1368 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 962 (1969).
16. See Fay v. Douds, 172 F.2d 720 (2d Cir. 1949). In Fay, a labor union, with-
out first exhausting its administrative remedies under the National Labor Relations Act,
sued in district court alleging that its status as the exclusive bargaining agent had been
terminated without a hearing by the National Labor Relations Board. The union ar-
gued that it had been deprived of property (its status as exclusive bargaining agent)
without due process of law. Id. at 723. Since the asserted constitutional right was
not "transparently frivolous," the court held that the district court had jurisdiction to
decide the issue. Id.; accord, Fitzgerald v. Hampton, 467 F.2d 755 (D.C. Cir. 1972);
Amos Treat & Co. v. SEC, 306 F.2d 260 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
However, this exception has been narrowly construed. See McCulloch v. Libby-
Owens-Ford Glass Co., 403 F.2d 916, 917 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S.




question which significantly affects the national interest, exhaustion
may not be required.2 ' Finally, the exhaustion requirement is not
applied rigorously when its application would deprive a criminal defend-
ant of his defense.18
The most recently developed exception to the exhaustion rule
consists of dispensing with the exhaustion of state administrative rem-
edies in section 1983 civil rights cases. As previously noted,1 9 section
1983 provides a judicial remedy to a person whose constitutional or
statutory rights have been violated under color of state law. In Mon-
roe v. Pape,20 plaintiffs brought suit in federal district court against
Chicago police officers who allegedly violated section 1983 by breaking
into ,the plaintiffs' apartment and conducting two warrantless searches
which resulted in damage to their property. 2' The officers argued
in the Supreme Court,2" inter alia, that, since state law provided a
judicial remedy28 for the asserted injury, the suit had been improperly
brought.24 Reviewing at length the statutory history of section 1983,2"
17. See McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10,
17 (1963).
18. See McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185 (1969). See also Layton & Fine,
The Draft and Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies, 56 GEo. L.J. 315, 322-23
(1967). McKart was a criminal case in which the defendant was charged with failure
to report for military induction. His defense was that his exemption had been wrongly
denied. The government sought to block the use of that defense because of the defend-
ant's failure to contest the denial of his exemption through the proper administrative
procedures. In allowing the defendant to raise his defense, the Court noted that "use
of the exhaustion doctrine in criminal cases can be exceedingly harsh." 395 U.S. at
197.
Application of the exhaustion doctrine in cases like McKart would serve to deprive
one of his criminal defense because of his failure to assert a right in an earlier admin-
istrative proceeding. Thus, such cases are clearly different from the ordinary exhaus-
tion case in which the doctrine merely serves to delay the judicial assertion of a right.
19. See note 2 supra.
20. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
21. Id. at 169.
22. The court of appeals relied on Stift v. Lynch, 267 F.2d 237 (7th Cir. 1959)
(holding that state law enforcement officers are immune from prosecution under section
1983), in affirming the dismissal of the plaintiffs' claim by the district court. Monroe
v. Pape, 272 F.2d 365, 366 (1959). The police officers urged adoption of the Stift
holding in the Supreme Court, but the Court held that action by state law enforcement
officers is actionable since it is taken under color of state law. 365 U.S. at 183-87.
Monroe is most widely known for this holding on the meaning of "under color of state
law."
23. The constitution of Illinois prohibits unreasonable searches in much the same
language as the fourth amendment, ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 6, and provides that a person
shall have a remedy for all injuries to his privacy, id. art. 1, § 12.
24. 365 U.S. at 173-83.
25. The present section 1983 was originally passed as part of the Ku Klux Klan
Act of 1871, Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13. The impetus for the
rvol. 1974:408
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-1973
the Court found that section's principal aims to be (1) to "override
certain kinds of state laws,"26 (2) to provide "a remedy where state
law was inadequate,"27 and, more broadly, (3) "to provide a federal
remedy where the state remedy, though adequate in theory, was not
available in practice. '28  Reasoning that Congress enacted section
1983 to provide a federal alternative to state procedures for vindicating
individual rights, the Court held that exhaustion of state judicial relief
was not required in any case brought under section 1983: "The fed-
eral remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need
not be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked." 29
In McNeese v. Board of Education,3 ° black public school stu-
dents, alleging that their school was segregated in violation of the four-
teenth, amendment, sued the board of education in federal district
court under section 1983.P' The school board urged dismissal on the
ground that the students should have been required to pursue the state
administrative grievance procedure32 before filing suit.3" Although
passage of that Act was provided by part of President Grant's message to Congress:
A condition of affairs now exists in some States of the Union rendering
life and property insecure and the carrying of the mails and the collection
of revenues dangerous. The proof that such a condition exists in some locali-
ties is now before the Senate. That the power to correct these evils is beyond
the control of State authorities I do not doubt; that the power of the Executive
of the United States, acting within the limits of existing laws, is sufficient
for present emergencies is not clear. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 244
(1871).
The historical climate which spawned the Act is also demonstrated by the congres-
sional debates. For example, Representative Lowe of Kansas graphically illustrated one
view of prevailing conditions:
While murder is stalking abroad in disguise, while whippings and lynch-
ings and banishments have been visited upon unoffending American citi-
zens, the local administrations have been found inadequate or unwilling to ap-
ply the proper corrective. Combinations, darker than the night that hides
them, conspiracies, wicked as the worst of felons could devise, have gone un-
whipped of justice. Id. at 374.
See also S. REP. No. 1, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. (1871); 1 B. ScHWARTZ, supra note 4, at
591-653.
26.' 365 U.S. at 173.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 174.
29. Id. at 183. The Court rejected the argument that since the political climate
which existed in the states in 1871, see note 25 supra, no longer exists, the purposes
of section 1983 do not suffice to permit direct access to a federal judicial remedy:
Although the legislation was enacted because of the conditions that ex-
isted in the South at that time, it is cast in general language and is as applic-
able to Illinois as it is to the States whose names were mentioned over and
again in the debates. It is no answer that the State has a law which if en-
forced would give relief. Id.
30. 373 U.S. 668 (1963).
31. Id. at 669-70.
32. This administrative procedure involved a hearing by the Superintendent of Pub-
lic Instruction on any complaint alleging segregation made by 50, or 10 percent, of
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McNeese involved exhaustion of a state administrative rather than
state judicial remedy, 4 the Supreme Court relied heavily upon the
discussion in Monroe v. Pape of the purposes behind section 198331
and held that the suit had been properly brought. Significantly, how-
ever, the Court also questioned the adequacy of the state administra-
tive remedy; 36 thus, it is unclear whether the decision was based on
the broad principle that exhaustion of state administrative remedies
is unnecessary in all section 1983 cases or on the narrower ground
that the administrative remedy was in fact inadequate.1"7
However, in Damico v. California,s a per curiam opinion,"m the
the residents of a school district, whichever is less. If the hearing determines that
the complaint is substantially correct, the Superintendent must request the Attorney
General to apply to the courts for appropriate relief. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 122, § 22-
19 (1962).
33. Both the district court, McNeese v. Board of Educ., 199 F. Supp. 403 (E.D.
ll. 1961), and the court of appeals, McNeese v. Board of Educ., 305 F.2d 783 (7th
Cir. 1962), accepted this argument and dismissed the suit for failure to exhaust the
administrative remedy.
34. The Supreme Court has been criticized for its "precipitous application of a de-
cision concerning exhaustion of alternate judicial remedies [Monroe) to the quite dif-
ferent problem of exhaustion of state administrative remedies [McNeese]." Note, Ex-
haustion of State Remedies Under the Civil Rights Act, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 1201, 1204
(1968). Since the first important administrative agency in the United States (the In-
terstate Commerce Commission) was not established until 1887, see L. JAFFE 9, the
availability of state administrative relief for particular grievances was clearly not con-
templated when section 1983 was originally enacted in 1871, see note 2 supra. Thus,
the Court could have easily limited Monroe to state judicial remedies. However, the
Court's extension of Monroe to excuse exhaustion of state administrative, as well as
judicial, remedies seems reasonable in light of Monroe's finding that section 1983 was
meant to provide a federal judicial alternative, without regard to what state relief might
be available. See note 29 supra.
35. See 373 U.S. at 671-74.
36. Id. at 674-76. See notes 11-13 supra and accompanying text. On the other
hand, the administrative remedy was not deemed inadequate by the district court, Mc-
Neese v. Board of Educ., 199 F. Supp. 403, 407-08 (E.D. Ill. 1961), the court of ap-
peals, McNeese v. Board of Educ., 305 F.2d 783, 786 (7th Cir. 1962), or by Mr. Jus-
tice Harlan in dissent, McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668, 677-78 (1963).
37. A majority of the courts interpreted McNeese broadly as dispensing with the
requirement of state exhaustion in section 1983 cases. See, e.g., Springfield School
Comm. v. Barksdale, 348 F.2d 261, 265 (lst Cir. 1965) (dictum); Powell v. Work-
men's Compensation Bd., 327 F.2d 131, 135 (2d Cir. 1964); York v. Story, 324 F.2d
450, 456 (9th Cir. 1963); Lee v. Hodges, 321 F.2d 480, 484 (4th Cir. 1963) (dictum);
Ferrell v. Dallas Ind. School Dist., 261 F. Supp. 545, 549 (N.D. Tex. 1966); Scolnick
v. Winston, 219 F. Supp. 836, 839 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 825 (1964).
However, some courts limited McNeese as applying only when the state remedy was
inadequate. See, e.g., Kabelka v. City of New York, 272 F. Supp. 998, 999-1000 (S.D.
N.Y. 1967) (dictum); Christmas v. Board of Educ., 231 F. Supp. 331, 339 (D. Md.
1964) (dictum).
38. 389 U.S. 416 (1967) (per curiam).
39. In his dissent, Justice Harlan protested the deciding of the issues without briefs
and oral argument. Id. at 420 (dissenting opinion).
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Supreme Court treated as settled the question of exhaustion of state
administrative remedies in section 1983 suits. Damico involved a chal-
lenge in federal court to the constitutionality of a provision of the Cali-
fornia Welfare and Institutions Code which regulates the operation of the
California Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) pro-
gram.40 No complaint had previously been filed with the state agency
that had responsibility for hearing complaints alleging wrongful depri-
vation of AFDC benefits.41  A three-judge court dismissed the suit
for failure to exhaust the state administrative relief, but the Supreme
Court reversed, interpreting McNeese as standing for the proposition
that "relief under the Civil Rights Act may not be defeated because
relief was not first sought under the state law which -provided [an ad-
ministrative] remedy."42  Thus, Damico clearly suggests that exhaus-
tion is not required of a plaintiff suing under section 1983, notwith-
standing the availability of adequate state administrative remedies.43
40. The provision under attack denied aid to persons whose need for benefits was
due to parental separation or desertion of less than three months' duration, unless a
suit for divorce had been filed. CAL. WELFARE AND INSTITUTIONS CODE § 11250,
11254 (West 1972); 30 Op. ATr'Y GEN. 135 (Cal. 1957).
41. In order to qualify for federal funds under the federal AFDC program, Title
IV of the Social Securities Act, 42 U.S.C. H§ 601-44 (1970), a state must have an
approved plan. Id. § 601. The agency in question in Damico had been established
pursuant to a requirement that an approved plan have such an agency to hear griev-
ances. Id. § 602(a) (4).
42. 389 U.S. at 417 (brackets in original).
43. The Fifth Circuit has consistently read Damico as excusing exhaustion of state
administrative remedies in all section 1983 cases. See Beale v. Blount, 461 F.2d 1133,
1139 n.11 (5th Cir. 1972); Chisley v. Richland Parish School Bd., 448 F.2d 1251,
1252-53 (5th Cir. 1971); Hobbs v. Thompson, 448 F.2d 456, 461 (5th Cir. 1971);
Burnett v. Short, 441 F.2d 405, 406 (5th Cir. 1971) (dicta); Moreno v. Henckel, 431
F.2d 1299, 1305-07 (5th Cir. 1970).
The Fifth Circuit is not alone in its broad reading of Damico. See Stradley v.
Andersen, 456 F.2d 1063, 1064 (8th Cir. 1972); Johnson v. San Francisco Unified
School Dist., 339 F. Supp. 1315, 1342 (N.D. Cal.), application for stay pending appeal
denied, 404 U.S. 1215 (1971); Callahan v. Sanders, 339 F. Supp. 814, 817 (M.D. Ala.
1971); C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL CounTs 187 n.6 (2d ed. 1970).
However, the Supreme Court's language in King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968),
a case decided subsequent to Damico, has been interpreted by some courts as limiting
Damico. In King, the plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of a regulation promul-
gated by the Alabama AFDC program, which denied AFDC benefits to children whose
mother cohabited with, or was frequently visited by, an able bodied male regardless
of whether that male actually contributed to, or was legally obligated to contribute to,
the support of the children. Exhaustion of the state administrative remedy was not
required, but the Supreme Court seemingly limited Damico by stating that it established
the proposition that exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required in section
1983 cases "where the constitutional challenge is sufficiently substantial. . . to require
the convening of a three-judge court." Id. at 312 n.4.
In Metcalf v. Swank, 444 F.2d 1353 (7th Cir. 1971), vacated and remanded, 406
U.S. 914 (1972), a majority of the Seventh Circuit interpreted Damico and King
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Since the above Supreme Court decisions dealt only with the ap-
as excusing exhaustion only when a three-judge court is convened to decide whether
a statute is unconstitutional on its face. Id. at 1356; accord, UAW v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 350 F. Supp. 522, 527 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Marin v. University of
P.R., 346 F. Supp. 470, 477 (D.P.R. 1972). The Supreme Court later vacated the
decision in Metcalf, Metcalf v. Swank, 406 U.S. 914 (1972), and remanded for con-
sideration in light of Carter v. Stanton, 405 U.S. 669 (1972), a case "indistinguishable"
from Damico in which exhaustion was excused. Id. at 671. The case of Houghton
v. Shafer, 392 U.S. 639 (1968) (per curiam), also renders the Metcalf analysis doubtful.
In Houghton, a state prisoner who alleged unlawful confiscation of legal materials by
prison authorities was not required to exhaust his remedies in the prison administration
even though a three-judge court had not been convened. Id. at 640. These facts seem
to indicate that the Metcalf court attributed too much significance to King's footnoted
reference to three-judge courts and "substantial" constitutional challenges. See Brooks
v. Center Township, 485 F.2d 383, 386 (7th Cir. 1973).
In Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 841
(1970), the Second Circuit interpreted the Damico line of decisions as standing for
the proposition that "[e]xhaustion of state administrative remedies is not required
where the administrative remedy is inadequate . . . or where it is certainly or probably
futile . . . ." Id. at 569; accord, Marin v. University of P.R., 346 F. Supp. 470,
476-77 (D.P.R. 1972); Vistamar, Inc v. Vasquez, 337 F. Supp. 375, 378 (D.P.R.
1971); cf. Kochie v. Norton, 343 F. Supp. 956, 958-60 (D. Conn. 1972). The Eisen
court concluded:
We shall need much clearer directions than the Court has yet given or, we
believe, will give, before we hold that plaintiffs in such cases may turn their
backs on state administrative remedies and rush into a federal forum ....
421 F.2d at 569.
One difficulty with the Eisen court's reading of the cases is that, although the
Supreme Court in Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U.S. 639 (1968) (per curiam), indicated
that pursuit of the state administrative relief, the exhaustion of which was excused,
might well have been futile, the Houghton Court went on to state that "[tin any event,
resort to these remedies is unnecessary in light of our decisions in Monroe. . . . Mc-
Neese, and Damico . . . ." 392 U.S. at 640 (emphasis added); see Metcalf v.
Swank, 406 U.S. 914 (1972) (dissenting opinion). A second difficulty is the fact
that the Supreme Court chose to base its opinions in McNeese and Damico on the
purposes of section 1983, see notes 30-42 supra and accompanying text, since the
futility of seeking, or the inadequacy of, the administrative remedy would seem suf-
ficient to excuse exhaustion even in suits not brought under section 1983. See notes
11-13 supra and accompanying text.
The First Circuit still requires exhaustion in section 1983 cases brought by school
teachers whose contracts are not renewed. See Beattie v. Roberts, 436 F.2d 747, 748-
49 (1st Cir. 1971); Dunham v. Crosby, 435 F.2d 1177, 1180-81 n.2 (1st Cir. 1970);
Drown v. Portsmouth School Dist., 435 F.2d 1182, 1186 n.10 (1st Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 972 (1971). The First Circuit has explained:
We require exhaustion, in part, because we hesitate to hold members of
school committees liable for tentative dismissal decisions when they are denied
the opportunity to view the issue in the light of the facts and arguments which
the affected teachers might introduce in a formal hearing. Beattie v. Roberts,
436 F.2d 747, 748-49 (1st Cir. 1971).
However, in view of the recent Supreme Court opinion in Preiser v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 475 (1973), the Fifth Circuit's broad interpretation of Damico seems correct.
In Preiser, state prisoners brought section 1983 actions, in conjunction with a habeas
corpus action, alleging that their good-behavior-time credits had been unconstitutionally
cancelled. The six-man majority held that the habeas corpus action is the sole federal
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plication of the exhaustion doctrine in cases brought under section
1983 of the Civil Rights Act, the question remains whether the excep-
tion apparently established by those decisions should be extended to
excuse exhaustion of federal administrative remedies by plaintiffs as-
serting civil rights violations. Recently, in two cases involving alleged
employment discrimination by federal agencies, the Fifth Circuit has
considered the argument that, since exhaustion of state administrative
remedies is not required in actions brought under section 1983 of the
Civil Rights Act,4 4 exhaustion of federal administrative remedies
should be excused in actions brought under section 1981 of that Act.45
In Beale v. Blount,46 the plaintiff, alleging that he had been discharged
from his position as a letter carrier solely on the basis of race, brought
suit against the government under section 1981. 47  Prior to bringing
remedy for a state prisoner challenging the fact or duration of his confinement, id.
at 489; thus, complete exhaustion of the state administrative remedy was required by
statute, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1970). However, the opinion noted that "if a remedy
under the Civil Rights Act is available, a plaintiff need not first seek redress in a state
forum." 411 U.S. at 477; see id. at 494. In view of the majority's recognition that
the policies behind exhaustion are quite strong in cases brought by state prisoners, id.
at 491-93, the opinion's broad language is especially significant. In addition, the three
dissenters clearly interpreted the section 1983 exception very broadly. Id. at 500-01,
522.
44. See note 2 supra.
45. See note 4 supra. A somewhat similar question has arisen in pre-1972 cases
where a plaintiff alleging unlawful employment practices has sued under section 1981
without first utilizing the procedures of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e-1 to -15 (1970). Title VII proscribed certain discriminatory employment
practices, id. §§ 2000e-2 to -3, and established the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC), id. § 2000e-4. The EEOC was empowered to investigate
charges of unlawful employment practices and to attempt to eliminate such practices
through conciliation, id. § 2000e-5, but its enforcement powers were virtually non-ex-
istent. See BNA, TAn EQuAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTuNrr Acr OF 1972, 58-59 (1973).
The courts split on the question of whether the EEOC procedure could be deliberately
bypassed. Compare Caldwell v. National Brewing Co., 443 F.2d 1044, 1046 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 916 (1971), and Young v. International Tel. & Tel. Co., 438
F.2d 757, 761-63 (3d Cir. 1971) (both holding one may deliberately bypass the EEOC
procedure) with Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Workers of Int'l Harvester Co., 427 F.2d
476, 487 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 911 (1970) (a reasonable excuse must be
pleaded for bypassing the EEOC procedure). The situation in the EEOC cases dif-
fered from that in Beale v. Blount, 461 F.2d 1133 (5th Cir. 1972), and Penn v. Schles-
inger, 490 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1973), two recent Fifth Circuit cases, in that the ad-
ministrative procedures available in Beale and Penn, see notes 49, 58 infra, were far
more likely to resolve the complaint than were the conciliatory EEOC procedures. How-
ever, the 1972 amendments to Title VII, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e-1 to -16 (1974),
have strengthened the enforcement procedures of the EEOC, see BNA, supra at 58-59,
so that the situations are now more analogous.
46. 461 F.2d 1133 (5th Cir. 1972).
47. Such a claim is cognizable under section 1981. See Keys v. Continental 111.
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 357 F. Supp. 376, 379 (N.D. Ill. 1973). See note 4 supra.
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suit Beale had contested his discharge through administrative review
procedures which had upheld -the decision to terminate his employ-
ment.48  However, he had not raised the charge of racial discrimina-
tion in these administrative proceedings.49  Nevertheless, the plaintiff
contended that the Monroe-McNeese-Damico line of cases estab-
lished the proposition that a plaintiff under the Civil Rights Act need
not exhaust available administrative remedies prior to seeking judicial
relief.5 0 The court rejected this argument, concluding that those three
cases were based upon the rationale that there is "no rational basis
for requiring a claimant to exhaust state administrative remedies be-
fore being permitted to institute an action in federal court to redress
the deprivation of a federal right." 1  The Beale court noted that the
plaintiff's situation, as one contesting federal agency action under sec-
tion 1981, was "totally dissimilar" from that of a plaintiff attacking
state action under section 198352 since the federal government is "on
record" by act of congress and executive order as being officially op-
posed to racial discrimination in employment practices.5 3 Conse-
quently, the court dismissed the suit for failure to comply with "the
time-tested requirement that available administrative remedies be ex-
hausted" before judicial relief is sought."
In a 1973 decision, Penn v. Schlesingerl5 the Fifth Circuit again
The court held that Beale's claims for injunctive relief and damages were barred by
sovereign immunity, but it declared that the part of the action that was in the nature
of a writ of mandamus was not so barred. 461 F.2d at 1137-38.
48. Beale's employment was terminated because of alleged threats made in argu-
ments with his supervisor. 461 F.2d at 1135-36. In the administrative process chal-
lenging his termination, Beale limited his defense to matters in extenuation. Id. at
1136.
49. At the time of Beale's termination in 1970, the available administrative griev-
ance procedure was set out in the Civil Service Commission's Regulations, 5 C.F.R.
§§ 713.201-.241 (1970). The regulations provided for mandatory attempts at informal
resolution, id. §§ 713.213, 713.217(a), an investigation by the agency's Director of
Equal Employment Opportunity, id. § 713.216, an opportunity to have findings made
at a full evidentiary hearing considered in the decision by the agency head, id. §§ 713.-
217(b), 713.218, 713.221(a), and a review of an agency head's adverse decision by
the Board of Appeals and Review, id. §§ 713.231-.236.
In 1972, these regulations were supplemented by adding to the Equal Employment
Opportunities Act provisions designed to make the Civil Service Commission more
forceful and effective. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-16 (1974).
50. 461 F.2d at 1138.




55. 490 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1973). Discrimination in the promotion process is ac-
tionable under section 1981. See Copeland v. Mead Corp., 51 F.R.D. 266 (N.D. Ga.
1970). See note 4 supra.
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addressed the exhaustion issue in the context of a 1981 suit brought
by aggrieved federal employees. In Penn, two black civilian employ-
ees of the Department of Defense alleged that they had been denied
promotions solely on the basis of their race.56 On numerous occasions
both plaintiffs had complained to their white supervisors about their
lack of advancement. However, neither had been informed of his
right to submit his complaint to an Equal Employment Opportunity
officer 57 and thereby initiate the administrative processes specifically
established to resolve racial discrimination grievances.5" Judge Tuttle,
writing the opinion of the court, initially observed that the Beale de-
cision clearly established that 1981 plaintiffs may not deliberately ig-
nore federal administrative remedies prior to seeking judicial relief. 9
However, he distinguished Penn from the Beale decision by noting
that in the latter case the plaintiff had "deliberately bypassed" his ad-
ministrative remedies.6 0  In contrast, the Penn plaintiffs had not been
informed of their right to an administrative remedy." Thus, Judge
Tuttle held that "exhaustion is completed at the point where agency
personnel [refuse] to further process grievances and pass them on
to the next link in the chain of command. '6 2 Judge Morgan concurred
with the result, but stongly argued that exhaustion of administrative
remedies is not required in any action brought under the Civil Rights
Act, relying on the Damico opinion.63  Although Judge Morgan con-
ceded that Damica and its predecessors only involved failure to ex-
haust state, as opposed to federal, administrative remedies, he con-
tended that the policies which require exhaustion of state administra-
56. 490 F.2d at 701.
57. In fact, one supervisor, who was an Equal Employment Opportunity Counselor
(and thus under a duty to inform an aggrieved person of his rights, 5 C.F.R. § 713.-
217(b) (1971)), told one plaintiff that "he would have to file a suit if he expected
to carry his complaint further." 490 F.2d at 705.
58. The administrative procedures available were set forth in 5 C.F.R. §§ 713.201-
.241 (1971) and were the same as those available in 1970 to Beale. See note 49 supra.
59. Judge Tuttle observed that Beale had drawn "a distinction between federal
court actions against federal officials and federal court action against a state agency
or official. This distinction, having been drawn, is binding on us." 490 F.2d at 705
n.11.
60. Id. at 706.
61. See note 57 supra.
62. 490 F.2d at 706.
63. Curiously, Judge Morgan asserted that "Judge Tuttle correctly states that in
light of our conclusion that the plaintiffs exhausted all available administrative reme-
dies, it is unnecessary to decide whether exhaustion was required." Id. at 707. This
interpretation of Judge Tuttle's opinion appears untenable in view of the fact that Judge
Tuttle cited, as controlling authority, the Beale holding that exhaustion of federal ad-
ministrative remedies is required. See note 59 supra.
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five remedies are even more compelling than those which require ex-
haustion of federal administrative remedies, since the federal-state
comity considerations are stronger in the former instance. 4 There-
fore, he concluded that "if state exhaustion is not required, a fortiori,
exhaustion of federal remedies should not be required."' 5
In dissent, Judge Godbold joined the majority in maintaining that
the exhaustion requirement fully applied in 1981 cases but strongly
disagreed with Judge Tuttle's view that the Penn plaintiffs had suffi-
ciently exhausted available administrative remedies. The dissent did
not directly address the broad contention of the concurrence that ex-
haustion is not required in civil rights cases. Rather, Judge Godbold
merely outlined the principles which underlie the exhaustion doctrine
and then, focusing narrowly on the facts of the case before him, ap-
plied those principles to conclude that such "policies are disserved by
permitting these plaintiffs to skip all the administrative procedural
steps that begin with the filing of a written complaint."' 6 In sum,
Judge Tuttle, by finding the court bound by the holding in Beale, and
Judge Godbold, by examining the facts of the Penn case only in light
of the general principles underlying the exhaustion doctrine, appar-
ently agreed that the exhaustion doctrine applies in suits against the
federal government under section 1981 but disagreed as to what con-
stitutes compliance with that requirement. Judge Morgan, in contrast,
would not require exhaustion of available administrative remedies, either
state or federal, in any civil rights case.
The separate rationales relied upon by Judge Tuttle and by dis-
senting Judge Godbold in reaching the same conclusion as to the appli-
cability of the exhaustion requirement in actions brought against the
federal government under section 1981 are equally unpersuasive. As
noted above, Judge Tuttle, albeit somewhat reluctantly, found the
court bound by the broad holding in Beale that, since the federal gov-
ernment is "on record" as being officially opposed to racial discrimina-
tion in employment, the exception to the exhaustion requirement
which has been granted to plaintiffs in actions contesting state discrim-
inatory practices under section 1983 is inapplicable to plaintiffs pro-
ceeding against the federal government under section 1981.7 While
64. Id. at 707.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 712. Judge Godbold argued that allowing the Penn plaintiffs to bypass
the comprehensive administrative review procedures prevented the administrative agency
involved from (1) developing a factual record, (2) exercising its discretion and exper-
tise, and (3) correcting its own errors. Id.
67. See note 59 supra and accompanying text.
[Vol. 1974:408
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-1973
it will be seen that adherence to this distinction by the Beale court
was sound, 68 the reasoning by which it was reached is not persuasive
since, in addition to the federal government, many states are on record
as opposed to discrimination in employment.6" Equally unconvincing
is the dissent's argument that exhaustion was required in the circum-
stances of the Penn case merely because the purposes of the doctrine
would be served thereby. The conclusion that this line of reasoning is
far from dispositive becomes immediately apparent when it is realized
that those same purposes may also be contravened by the still valid
holding of the Monroe-McNeese-Damico line of cases that a section 1983
plaintiff need not exhaust his state administrative remedies.
Although the opinions are unconvincing, the result reached by
the Beale court and the Penn dissent"0 may be justified by an alterna-
tive analysis. When one focuses on the reasoning which led the Su-
preme Court in the Monroe-McNeese-Damico line of cases to develop
what the Fifth Circuit has interpreted as an absolute exception to the
exhaustion of state administrative remedies in section 1983 cases, it
becomes apparent -that the rationale which underlies that exception
will not support the extension of that exception to excuse exhaustion
of federal administrative remedies in section 1981 cases. Section
1983 was enacted at a time when there was a felt need for a federal
remedy for civil fights violations because the political climate in some
states cast doubt on the efficacy of state remedies. 71  Therefore, the
Supreme Court concluded that Congress enacted section 1983 in order
to provide a federal judicial' remedy as an alternative to both state
judicial and state administrative remedies in civil rights cases.72
Thus, the alternative nature of the section 1983 remedy provided the
basis for dispensing with exhaustion of state administrative remedies
in section 1983 cases. 73  However, in section 1981 cases dealing with
68. See notes 70-75 infra and accompanying text.
69. See, e.g., ALAS. STAT. oh. 80, §§ 18.80.010-.300 (1969); CAL. LABOR CODE §§
1410-33 (West 1972); HAwAII Rnv. STAT. ch. 378, §§ 378-1 to -10 (1973 Supp.); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 48, §§ 851-61 (1973 Supp.); N.Y. Exnc. LAw §§ 290-301 (McKinney
1973 Supp.); Omo RaV. CODE, ch. 4112, §§ 4112.01-.99 (1973). About three-fourths
of the states have laws prohibiting employment discrimination which are enforced by
some type of agency. BNA, supra note 45, at 73-80.
70. The concurring judge in Penn concentrated solely on the consideration of fed-
eral-state comity to conclude that exhaustion should be excluded in section 1981 cases
as well as section 1983 cases. See notes 63-65 supra and accompanying text. That
analysis seems faulty in that it fails to recognize that the factors which led to the sec-
tion 1983 exception are not present in section 1981 cases. See notes 71-75 infra and
accompanying text.
71. See note 25 supra.
72. See notes 30-43 supra and accompanying text.
73. See text accompanying note 29 supra (quotation from Monroe opinion).
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allegations of employment discrimination by the federal government,
a federal remedy already exists, 74 although that remedy is administra-
tive. And clearly, section 1981 was not enacted in order to provide
a federal judicial remedy as an alternative to federal administrative
remedies.75 Therefore, since the "alternative remedy" analysis which
underlies the section 1983 state exhaustion exception is inapplicable
to the situation of exhaustion of federal administrative remedies in sec-
tion 1981 cases, the Fifth Circuit was justified in refusing to dispense
with the requirement of exhaustion of federal administrative remedies
in section 1981 cases.
74. See note 49 supra.
75. The first important federal administrative agency, the Interstate Commerce
Commission, was not established until 1887, see L. JAFFE 9, twenty-one years after
the original enactment of section 1981 in 1866. See note 4 supra.
